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AN ANALYSIS OF THE INCONSISTENCIES REGARDING THE CO-
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOR REGISTERED COMPANY 
AUDITORS IN AUSTRALIA 
 
ABSTRACT:  This paper examines the inconsistencies regarding the co-regulatory 
environment for registered company auditors in Australia with particular reference to 
two regulator groups: (1) the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC); and (2) the professional accounting bodies.  Francis framework for quality 
audits is used as a basis to analyse this co-regulatory environment. This paper finds that 
this environment is inconsistent in terms of: the selection bias of the ASIC inspection 
program; access to client engagement documentation; interaction between professional 
accounting bodies and ASIC; non-Corporations Act audits and legal enforceability; 
differences in ASIC inspections vs. quality reviews; and, auditor option choice and 
stakeholder protection. Hence, there are registered company auditors (RCAs) who may 
be negligent (either intentionally or unintentionally) and have little possibility of being 
detected or if detected, may not be subject to legislative sanctioning. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Auditing plays an important role in many countries, including Australia, by providing 
a level of confidence for users of financial information through the independent 
verification of financial reports prepared by entities.1  This applies to entities in capital 
markets, local governments, not-for-profit organisations (i.e. national and regional 
community-based entities such as charities, sporting clubs, environmental groups, 
religious institutions and community interest organisations), professional associations 
(e.g. accounting, medical and engineering bodies), non-government schools and many 
others.2  It is not unreasonable to expect that users of financial reports require the level 
of confidence surrounding those reports to be as high as possible and this occurs when 
audit quality is present.3 
                                                 
1 See Paul M Healy and Krishna G Palepu, ‘Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital 
markets: A review of the empirical literature’ (2001) 31 Journal of Accounting and Economics 405, 406 
where the level of confidence is discussed. Also, Alice Belcher, ‘Audit quality and the market for audits: 
an analysis of recent UK regulatory policies’ (2006) 18(1) Bond Law Review 1 refers to the confidence 
that investors seek from auditors. Further note that the purpose of an audit is to ‘enhance the degree of 
confidence of intended users in the financial report.’ The relevant auditing standards are Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board, Forming an Opinion and Reporting on a Financial Report, ASA 700, 1 
December 2015; Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, Communicating Key Audit Matters in the 
Independent Auditor’s Report, ASA 701, 1 December 2015; Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, 
Modifications to the Opinion in the Independent Auditor’s Report, ASA 705, 1 December 2015; and 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, Emphasis of Matter Paragraphs and Other Matter 
Paragraphs in the Independent Auditor’s Report, ASA 706, 1 December 2015.  
2 These are in addition to the audits conducted by the various Auditors-General throughout the Australian 
jurisdictions (e.g. government departments, public hospitals and in some states universities). 
3 Paul J. Coram, Theodore J. Mock, Jerry L. Turner and Glen L. Gray, ‘The Communicative Value of 




Francis4 provides a rigorous framework for understanding audit quality5 from the 
supply side perspective.6  Key factors in the framework include a country’s legal 
system, the regulation of auditors and the institutions responsible for the oversight and 
administration of that regulation.  But ‘[w]e have barely scratched the surface in our 
understanding of the role of institutions, and this is a very important direction for future 
archival research on audit quality.’7  Francis argues that the incentives for auditors to 
produce high quality audits are affected by the design of regulations, the regulators, and 
the sanctions that punish misconduct and low quality audits.8  Hence, critical to the 
Francis framework is an effective regulatory environment.   
 
Regulation can be defined as ‘a sustained and focused control exercised by a public 
agency over activities valued by a community’.9  There are many reasons why 
regulation is important.10  One is that capital markets can only operate properly if users 
of financial information11 are sufficiently informed.  Regulation makes ‘information 
more extensively accessible, accurate and affordable, may protect consumers against 
                                                 
4 Jere R Francis, ‘A Framework for Understanding and Researching Audit Quality’ (2011) 30(2) 
Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 125. 
5 Audit quality can mean different things to different stakeholders, see Steve G Sutton, ‘Toward an 
Understanding of the Factors Affecting the Quality of the Audit Process’ (1993) 24 Decision Sciences, 
88. Audit quality is assumed to occur when there is no audit failure. Audit failure occurs where the 
auditor has not enforced the use of accounting standards by the client or when the audit report does not 
identify a material error. The result is that users of the financial information may be misled. See Jere R 
Francis, ‘What we know about audit quality’ (2004) 36 The British Accounting Review 345. Audit quality 
is also largely not observable since most of what occurs in the audit process is not available to 
stakeholders. See Gary Colbert and Dennis Murray, ‘State Accountancy Regulations, Audit Size, and 
Audit Quality: An Empirical Investigation’ (1999) 16 Journal of Regulatory Economics 267.  
6 Francis’s n4 125 paper identifies that audit quality can be viewed as arising from a supply side (which 
is dealt with in this paper) and a demand side. Among other things, the demand side deals with agency 
and signalling theories. 
7 Francis, n 4, 142. 
8 Francis, n 4, 126. 
9 P Selznick, ‘Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation’ in R. Noll (ed), (1985) Regulatory Policy 
and the Social Sciences 363 quoted in A. I. Ogus, Regulation Legal Form and Economic Theory 
(Clarendon Press, 1994). 
10 See the following for discussion of the various rationales; Cass R. Sunstein (1990) The Functions of 
Regulatory Statues in Anthony I. Ogus (ed), Regulation, Economics and the Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2001) 3-34; Roger G. Noll (1989) Economic Perspectives on the Politics of 
Regulation in Anthony I Ogus, Regulation, Economics and the Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
2001); Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave (1999) Understanding Regulation  Theory, Strategy and 
Practice Oxford University Press, 9-16. 
11 Users are those parties who rely on information presented in the financial reports to make decisions 
about providing resources to an entity and include existing and potential, lenders, and other creditors.  
See Australian Accounting Standards Board, Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of 
Financial Statements, Framework, 2016, para OB2. 
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information inadequacies and the consequences thereof and should encourage the 
operation of healthy, competitive markets.’12 
 
In the context of this paper, information is provided to ‘consumers’ (i.e. users) in the 
form of financial reports13 and the role of regulation is to add confidence to those reports 
through the audit regime.  It follows then that if the regulatory environment is 
inconsistent, or if the regulators are not empowered to properly regulate or if the path 
to sanctions is frustrated then there is the potential for some auditors not to produce 
high quality audits.  Our paper examines the co-regulatory environment in Australia for 
registered company auditors (RCAs) and its compliance with the Francis framework. 
 
The auditing profession14 in Australia operates in a co-regulatory15 environment which 
includes oversight functions that are driven by government regulation and the policies 
of professional accounting bodies. An analysis of this environment reveals inconsistent 
oversight of auditors, uncertainty in relation to the powers of the regulator, and 
insufficient powers of professional accounting bodies to properly regulate. The 
implications are that audit failure16 may be occurring, or could occur, and that the 
failure may not be detected, or if detected that auditors may possibly avoid sanctions. 
This paper therefore suggests that the present co-regulatory environment in Australia 
raises serious questions as to whether it meets the requirements of the Francis 
framework. 
                                                 
12 Martin Cave and Martin Lodge (2012) Understanding Regulation  Theory, Strategy and Practice by 
Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Oxford University Press 19. 
13 For consistency the term ‘financial reports’ is used in this paper.  Readers might also find the term 
‘financial statements’ in other circumstances. The two terms are interchangeable and generally 
incorporate a Statement of Profit or Loss and Other Comprehensive Income, Statement of Changes of 
Equity, Statement of Financial Position (often referred to as the Balance Sheet), Statement of Cash Flows 
and supporting Notes: Australian Accounting Standards Board, Presentation of Financial Statements, 
AASB 101, 20 June 2012, para 10.  
14 While auditors do not presently have a dedicated professional body in Australia and may be seen as a 
sub-group of the accounting profession, it is still appropriate to regard them as professionals of the 
auditing profession. See Sylvia R Cruess, Sharon Johnston and Richard L Cruess, ‘“Profession”: A 
Working Definition for Medical Educators’ (2004) 16 Teaching and Learning in Medicine: An 
International Journal 74, 75.  See also Ruth D Hines, ‘Financial Accounting Knowledge, Conceptual 
Framework Projects and the Social Construction of the Accounting Profession’ (1989) 2(2) Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal 72 where she refers to different aspects which make up a profession. 
15 The Institute of Chartered Accountants, Quality Review Report 2014 (September 2014), 5 
<http://www.charteredaccountants.com.au/~/media/Files/The%20Institute/Annual%20reports/2014/07
14-68%20CC%20Quality%20Review%20Report_WEB_FA.ashx>. 
16 Audit failure occurs when the audit opinion is unqualified, but there is a material misstatement in the 
financial reports. Kathryn Kadous, ‘The Effects of Audit Quality and Consequence Severity on Juror 




The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section II provides the background 
for understanding audit in terms of the Francis framework. Section III considers who 
audits in Australia? Section IV examines the co-regulatory environment for auditor 
oversight. Section V reports on the inconsistencies of the co-regulatory environment. 
Section VI provides several potential options to address the concerns. Section VII 
concludes the paper. 
 
II. UNDERSTANDING AUDIT IN TERMS OF THE FRANCIS FRAMEWORK 
The application of the Francis framework for the production of high quality audits 
assumes knowledge of auditing. However, the literature indicates that auditing can be 
misunderstood17 and therefore, clarification of the purpose of auditing and the role of 
auditors in the Australian context may well be fruitful. Many people understand an audit 
to be the regular verification of an entity’s financial reports. The outcome of the 
verification process is communicated to users through an audit report which conveys 
the auditor’s opinion concerning whether the financial reports are true and fair18 and 
assists users’ in their decisions.19 Although the vast majority of audit reports are 
unmodified (i.e. the financial reports are deemed to be true and fair), there is capacity 
for the auditor to comment on areas of concern.20 The practices and procedures of 
auditing can be viewed from two perspectives: (1) the demand side; and (2) the supply 
side. The demand side is driven by users’ requirements for audit quality,21 but is outside 
the scope of this paper.  
 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Brenda Porter, ‘An Empirical Study of the Audit Expectation-Performance Gap’ 
(1993) 24(2) Accounting and Business Research 49-68. 
18 Corporations Act s297 and s307(a)(ii) and Stephen Kwaku Asare and Arnold M. Wright, ‘Investors’, 
Auditors’, and Lenders’ Understanding of the Message Conveyed by the Standard Audit Reports on the 
Financial Statements’ (2012) 26(2) Accounting Horizons 193-217, 196. 
19 Asare and Wright, n 18 196. 
20 Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, Overall Objectives of the Independent Auditor and the 
Conduct of an Audit in Accordance with Australian Auditing Standards, ASA 200, 1 December 2015, 
para 3 (‘Overall Objectives’). 
21 The demand side incorporates agency theory, where auditors are used by investors to monitor the 
activities of management, (Brian T. Pentland, ‘Getting Comfortable with the Numbers: Auditing and the 
Micro-Production of Macro-Order’, (1993) 18 Accounting, Organizations and Society, 605, 606) reduce 
information asymmetry thus minimise the cost of capital, and to detect expropriations (D. Paul Newman, 
Evelyn R. Patterson and J. Reed Smith, ‘The Role of Auditing in Investor Protection’ (2005) 80 The 
Accounting Review 289, 290, 303). 
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The Francis framework relates to the ‘supply side’ for audit quality. He prescribes six 
input elements into this framework: (1) audit inputs; (2) audit processes; (3) accounting 
firms; (4) audit industry and audit markets; (5) economic consequences of audit 
outcomes; and (6) institutions (or institutional settings). Of particular interest in this 
paper are the institutions which: 
“… Refers to the legal system in a country that determines an auditor’s legal responsibilities, as 
well as the broad set of institutions that regulate accounting and auditing practices and, 
therefore, create incentives for both individuals and accounting firms.22 
Francis’s institutional setting can be synthesised into the following three components: 
(1) the governance structures used by entities to strategize and oversee their operations; 
(2) the laws dealing with auditors; and (3) the bodies responsible for regulating auditors. 
Governance structures within organisations (e.g. the board of directors) are linked to 
audit quality through the oversight and monitoring of external auditors.23 There is a 
further overlay for those organisations which also have audit committees.24 The 
oversight and monitoring roles of audit committees include negotiation of the auditor 
engagement, facilitation of the audit process, resolution of areas of concern that are 
identified by the auditor and management of post-audit issues. 
 
While the governance models and structures are important to Francis’s institutional 
setting, it is not the focus of this paper. However, the laws dealing with auditors and 
the bodies responsible for regulating auditors are of specific interest. Direct links have 
been made between the legal environment and the incentives and behaviours of 
auditors.25  It has been shown that where UK companies access US markets, auditors 
charge a premium on their fees to hedge against the greater litigious environment 
there.26 In particular, their behaviour changes as a result of the effect of a specific 
law/regulation. In the US, audit fees grew post the implementation of the Sarbanes-
                                                 
22 Francis, n 4, 140. 
23 Jere R. Francis, ‘What do we know about audit quality?’ (2004) 36 The British Accounting Review, 
357. 
24 Audit Committees are mandatory in Australia for companies included in the S & P All Ordinaries 
Index at the beginning of its financial year.  See ASX Limited Listing Rule 12.7. Other companies do 
elect to have Audit Committees although not legally required to do so. Other entities also might be 
required to have Audit Committees. For example, Local Government Act (SA) s126 requires local 
governments to have an audit committee. 
25 Francis above n 23 359. 
26 Ananth Seetharaman, Ferdinand A. Gul and Stephen G. Lynn, ‘Litigation risk and audit fees: evidence 
from UK firms cross-listed on US markets’ (2002) 33 Journal of Accounting and Economics 91. 
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Oxley Act.27 This Act increased the amount of regulation and introduced a regulator 
primarily as a result of the Enron collapse. The inference again being that auditors 
reacted (i.e. behaviour changed) due to increased regulation.28 Nevertheless, not all 
research clearly shows that regulation and regulators do matter to auditors.29 What is 
clear though is that interventionist regulation and regulators will continue to affect audit 
quality, and that more research and understanding on this issue is warranted.30 
 
Statutory and common law both impact on auditors in Australia. The Corporations 
Act31 and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 32 have a direct 
effect on auditors. Other statutes can have an indirect impact on auditors. For instance, 
any deceptive and misleading conduct by auditors may be captured under the 
Competition and Consumer Act.33 Common law also applies to auditors. Cases 
primarily dealing with professional negligence and contract law have been determined 
over many decades and much is available in the literature regarding this. 
 
The regulators for auditors and the auditing process in Australia are the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the professional accounting 
bodies. Further, the Francis framework for audit quality includes institutions or 
institutional settings, and incorporates a regulatory environment which is the legal 
system in a country.  A part of that system includes the monitoring and oversight of 
auditors.  The objective here is that the monitoring and oversight activities need to be 
effective to provide the incentive for auditors to behave in a manner that produces audit 
quality.   
 
III.   WHO AUDITS IN AUSTRALIA? 
It is evident that Francis’s framework for audit quality includes the auditor. After all, it 
is their behaviour that is being targeted.  However, in Australia, identifying the auditor 
                                                 
27 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 15 USC 7201 (2002). 
28 Aloke Ghosh and Robert Pawlewicz, ‘The Impact of Regulation on Auditor Fees: Evidence from the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’ (2009) 28(2) Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 171. 
29 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez De Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, ‘What Works in Securities Laws’ 
(2003) Working Paper No. 03-22, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
30 Mark DeFond and Jieying Zhang, ‘A review of archival auditing research’ (2014) 58 Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 275, 314. 
31 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations Act’). 
32 2001 (Cth) (‘ASIC Act’). 
33 2010 (Cth). 
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is not as straight forward as one might expect. In the context of financial report audits, 
the term ‘auditor’ is specifically used to denote the person who undertakes that audit 
and signs the audit report.34 The main auditor designations in Australia in this specific 
context are registered company auditors (RCAs) and professional accounting body 





The RCA is the only legislatively established auditor designation in Australia in terms 
of financial report audits.35 An RCA is established by the Corporations Act and the 
primary role is to audit the financial reports of companies in Australia.36 The approval 
and maintenance (including investigations) of RCAs is managed by the regulator, 
ASIC.37 Once approved, any RCA has the legislative authority to audit the largest and 
most complex companies in Australia. 
 
To be approved as an RCA38 an applicant must, inter alia, demonstrate that they have 
satisfied the minimum levels of ‘competence and integrity’ to be an auditor.39  
                                                 
34 Another role of audit relates to assurance engagements, which are essentially non-financial report 
audits. The term given to a person who conducts an assurance engagement is an ‘assurance practitioner’. 
An example of an assurance engagement is a compliance audit where that task is to ascertain if an entity 
has complied with a particular law, regulation, contract or policy.  It is fair to say that the term ‘assurance 
practitioner’ is not widely used in the business world, presumably because the term ‘auditor’ is more 
colloquial. While the different terminology may be confusing, it does separate out the role of an auditor 
with respect to financial reports and those of other engagements. 
35 There is another legislative auditor designation being Self-Managed Superannuation Fund (SMSF) 
auditors. From the 1st January 2013 SMSFs must have their accounts audited by an SMSF approved 
auditor: Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) s 35AC (‘SIS Act’). SMSF auditors are 
registered pursuant to s 128D of the SIS Act. Part 9A of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) 
Regulations 1994 (Cth) deals with the qualifications, knowledge and experience required for an SMSF 
auditor to be approved. ASIC is the regulator of SMSF auditors.  SMSF audits are quite specific to 
SMSFs and the skill and knowledge of SMSF auditors relate to SMSFs and are not necessarily fully 
transferable to the audit of a set of financial reports of other entities.  It is fair to say that an RCA has the 
necessary attributes to audit an SMSF, but it does not necessarily follow that an SMSF auditor has the 
attributes to audit non-SMSF activities. Consequently, while the SMSF auditor is a legislative auditor 
designation it is not one relevant to this paper. 
36 RCAs can also operate as audit firms and audit companies: see Corporations Act s 324AA for the 
appointment and s9 for the definitions of audit firm and audit company. 
37 ASIC’s role as the regulator is vital in the Australian financial and investment system.  This includes 
dealing with fraud and incompetence matters which impinge on that system. Suzanne Le Mire, ‘‘It's Not 
Fair!’ The Duty of Fairness and the Corporate Regulator’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 445. 
38 All Auditor Generals are recognised as an RCA: Corporations Act s 1281. 
39 Corporations Act s 1280 and operationalised by Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Regulatory Guide 180: Auditor registration (2016) 6. 
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Competence and integrity are determined by evidence of qualifications, skills and the 
applicant being capable, fit and proper.40 During the period 1981 to the present, the 
requirements prescribed by the Corporations Act and its antecedents for assessing 
applicant qualifications and being a capable, fit and proper remained relatively 
unchanged.  However, since 2004, the requirements for the demonstration of minimum 
skills level for prospective RCA’s have become significantly more rigorous.  
 
The passing of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and 
Corporate Disclosures) Act (CLERP9)41 resulted in changes to the demonstration of 
practical experience42 and the introduction of competency standards approved by the 
ASIC.43 The impact of these changes means that an individual must now show a more 
detailed and varied work experience than was previously required by ASIC to 
determine whether he or she has sufficient skills necessary to meet the requirements of 
s1280 of the Corporations Act. In particular, it is now more onerous than in previous 
times to become an RCA. Finally, RCAs are required to follow the auditing standards44 
in the conduct of audits and these are promulgated by the Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (AUASB). The AUASB was established under s 277A of the ASIC 
Act and is permitted to make auditing standards.45 
 
Members of professional accounting bodies who act as auditors 
There are three main professional accounting bodies in Australia: (1) Chartered 
Accountants Australia and New Zealand (CA ANZ); (2) CPA Australia (CPA) and; (3) 
the Institute of Public Accountants (IPA). The professional accounting bodies 
principally regulate the accounting profession. There is no specific legislation which 
controls the profession of accounting and there is nothing inhibiting anyone calling 
themselves an accountant regardless of whether they have the skill set to do so.46  This 
                                                 
40 See ASIC, n 39, for more detail. 
41 2004 (Cth). 
42 Prior to 2004, practical experience gained working under the direction of an RCA or as a supervisor 
was measured in years whereas in 2004 this experience must be specified in hours. 
43 The current arrangements began on 1st July 2004. 
44 Corporations Act s 307A. 
45 Corporations Act s 336. 
46 This has not always been the case.  For example in New South Wales the Public Accountants 
Registration Act was passed in 1945 and in Queensland the Registration of Public Accountants Act was 
passed in 1946. These Acts were repealed in 1989 and 1990 respectively. 
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also applies to the auditing profession and the use of the word ‘auditor’ (except for 
RCAs)47 and the legislation which applies thereto. 
 
These professional bodies all have similar structures in their membership provisions, 
ethical guidelines and disciplinary actions, and they also maintain quality review 
processes. However, the entry criteria for these bodies are not the same. 48 In particular, 
to become a chartered accountant, CA ANZ requires auditing as a mandatory course in 
both the academic entry requirements and their postgraduate program. To become a 
CPA, CPA Australia requires audit to be undertaken in either the academic entry 
requirements or their postgraduate program. Finally, IPA do not require auditing in 
either of their academic entry requirements or their postgraduate programs to become 
a full member. 
 
Members of the professional accounting bodies can be divided into two main groups: 
(1) those who are in public practice; and (2) those who are not. To work in public 
practice a member must hold a public practice certificate issued by the respective 
professional accounting bodies. In addition, the membership designations of the 
professional accounting bodies do not recognise a member operating in a specific 
discipline area (e.g. audit, tax or insolvency). For instance, a chartered accountant who 
is an RCA is not recognised as an auditor in their relevant membership post-nominals 
or membership category. Finally, members of all three professional accounting bodies 
                                                 
47 It should be noted that the vast majority of RCAs are also members of a professional accounting body. 
48 These are: CAANZ: to become a chartered accountant the most common path is for a person to have 
completed an accredited accounting undergraduate or master’s degree which must include auditing, 
completed the Chartered Accountants program operated by CAANZ which includes a module on 
auditing and assurance and undertaken at least three years full time experience in a relevant accounting 
role: Chartered Accountants Australia, Chartered Accountants Program (1 April 2015) 
<http://www.charteredaccountants.com.au/Candidates/The-Chartered-Accountants-Program>. 
CPA Australia: to become a CPA the most common path is for a person to hold a qualification that is at 
least comparable to an Australian bachelor’s degree, demonstrate completion of foundation exams 
studies evidence certain accounting knowledge (normally included into the degree), completed the CPA 
program and undertaken minimum of 36 months fulltime relevant experience.  If auditing is not included 
in the included in the bachelor’s degree then a module on auditing must be completed as a part of the 
CPA program: CPA Australia, Types of Membership <http://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/become-a-
cpa/types-of-membership>. 
IPA: to become a member a person normally needs to have an accounting qualification (minimum 
Diploma of Accounting) and there is no mandatory requirement to do auditing, completed the relevant 
IPA program (the number of courses depends on the level of accounting qualification above) and there 
is no mandatory requirement to do auditing, undertaken three years of workplace experience under a 




who undertake an audit are required to follow the auditing standards promulgated by 
the AUASB,49 regardless of whether they are auditing a corporate or non-corporate 
entity. 
Requirements for an audit to be conducted 
An audit of an entity is conducted because there is a legislative requirement, a legal 
requirement (e.g. an agreement), a governance requirement or some voluntary decision 
to do so.  The focus of this paper is on those audits driven by legislation50 and those 
undertaken by RCAs. However, some legislation specifies only an RCA, while other 
legislation specifies either an RCA or a member of a professional accounting body.  
These two categories are now briefly considered. 
 
RCA only 
RCAs are the designated auditor for Corporations Act audits, but there are many other 
statutes throughout Australia which require an RCA to undertake the audit of an entity. 
Two examples are provided as follows: 
(1) The Local Government Act 1999 (SA), the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) and 
the Local Government Act 2008 (NT) all require their respective local governments 
to have an annual audit undertaken by an RCA. There are a total of 236 local 
governments in these jurisdictions.  A number of other jurisdictions also have 
similar provisions for their local governments; and 
(2) The Australian Charities and Not-for-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth) (‘ACNC 
Act’) requires large charities registered with the Australian Charities and Not-for-
Profits Commission to have their annual financial reports audited by an RCA.51  
There were 6,679 large charities registered in the 2013 financial year.52 
 
RCA or a member of a professional accounting body 
There are many occasions where legislation provides an option for either an RCA or a 
member of a professional accounting body to carry out an audit.  For example, the 
Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) requires ‘prescribed associations’ to have 
                                                 
49 Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board, Conformity with Auditing and Assurance 
Standards, APES 210, 2008, para 1.4. 
50 Primarily because that is visible through an examination of legislation. Information on the drivers of 
other audits is not readily available. 
51 Section 60.30. 
52 Penny Knight and David Gilchrist, Australian Charities 2013: The First Report on Charities 
Registered with the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (2014) 7. 
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their financial reports audited by an RCA or a member of CPA Australia or ICAA (now 
CA ANZ) or53 another person approved by the Commissioner.54 
 
It is also the case that some legislation places other conditions55 on members of 
professional accounting bodies, such as certification or demonstration of experience, 
over and above just being a member. For instance, the Land Agents Act 1994 (SA) 
requires members to hold a practising certificate issued by their professional accounting 
body.  If an audit of a community title scheme is undertaken in accordance with the 
Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) the auditor is to be: an 
RCA or a member of CPA Australia or ICAA (now CA ANZ) or IPA and have a total 
of two years auditing experience, whether continuous or not.56 
 
In addition to the two categories mentioned above, there are many other statutes that 
require an audit to be conducted, but do not mention an RCA. In some cases, although 
not exclusively, they refer to a member of a professional accounting body. Whilst these 
laws do not refer to an RCA, it does not necessarily preclude them, and if they meet the 
specific criteria then they are able to be the auditor. To understand the variations of 
demands on RCAs and other auditor designations, a study was undertaken in 2014-15.57  
This entailed an investigation into all statutes (and where necessary regulations) of the 
Commonwealth and every State and Territory where an audit was stipulated, to 
understand who the auditors are and their scope. Overall, 137 Acts required an RCA 
(of which the Corporations Act was just one), 81 Acts required an RCA or some other 
person (which includes a member of a professional accounting body), 222 Acts where 
no specific qualification was required and 101 unique terms were used to describe who 
the nominated auditor should or could be. By any measure, the variation in legislative 
requirements for auditors is significant. Explanations for the variations are speculative, 
but it is likely that there is confusion with legislators and legislative drafters about 
auditor designations and what qualifications an auditor needs.   
                                                 
53 While this example refers only to members of ICAA (CA ANZ) or CPA members, there are many 
other Acts which also include members of the IPA. 
54 Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 35(2)(b). 
55 For example the stipulation of a requirement for a practising certificate and/or certain levels of 
experience. 
56 Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) s 150, sch 6 (definition of ‘registered 
company auditor’). 
57Registered Company Auditors Summary of Chartered Accountants ANZ Research, Chartered 




Overall, who audits Australia is not as well-structured and integrated as one might 
expect. Although RCA services are demanded by the Corporations Act, there are many 
other pieces of legislation which make similar demands. This is further complicated 
because some legislation also provides choices between an RCA, a member of a 
professional accounting body or some other alternative. 
 
Francis’s framework calls for regulatory monitoring and oversight of auditors as a part 
of audit quality. Given that the focus of this paper is on RCAs then, again, one might 
think that it is straight forward. However, it is not. The monitoring and oversight of 
auditors in Australia (including RCAs) is co-regulatory, between ASIC and the 
professional accounting bodies, and this is discussed in the next section. 
 
IV. CO-REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOR AUDITOR OVERSIGHT 
In Australia, there are two regulators58 for auditor oversight. First, is ASIC who is 
responsible for the oversight of RCAs for audits they conduct primarily pursuant to the 
Corporations Act. Second, are the professional accounting bodies59 who are responsible 




ASIC manages the regulatory and disciplinary functions as the regulator for RCAs who 
conduct audits under the Corporations Act. It can also refer disciplinary actions to the 
Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board (CADB).61 Part 11 of the ASIC Act establishes 
the CADB and s1292 of the Corporations Act provides for its powers with respect to 
auditors and liquidators. The powers include a range of sanctions from reprimand to 
                                                 
58 The term regulator is used in its broadest sense.  ASIC is a regulator pursuant to statute, while 
professional accounting bodies are regulators of their members according to their respective 
constitutions. 
59 Unless there are specific provisions in legislation which we have not detected. 
60 This can also include RCAs as they are generally a member of one of the professional accounting 
bodies. 
61 Prior to 1st March 2017 this was known as the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinayr Board.  
ASIC can also impose conditions on registrations or enforceable undertakings. 
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cancellation of registration, and these have been applied to RCAs from both large and 
small firms.62 
 
The inspection program of RCAs by ASIC began in 2005 as a result of the introduction 
of CLERP9. The first report for the program concentrated on a series of findings from 
the inspections, but lacked any advice regarding the purpose of the inspection regime. 
A media release by ASIC regarding the report was also silent as to the purpose of the 
regime. While the backdrop for a regulator or ASIC inspection program is apparent (i.e. 
CLERP9 and preceding corporate collapses), it does not appear that there was a clear 
purpose for what the inspection program was to cover or intended to achieve. Given 
this fact, one might wonder how well the program was first strategized and whether it 
was a case of just doing something in the time after economic turmoil. However, 
subsequent ASIC communications do provide the objective of the audit inspection 
program as follows: 
 
The objective of [the] audit inspection program is to promote high quality external 
audits of financial reports under Chapter 2M of the Corporations Act and raise the 
standard of conduct in the auditing profession. This helps to ensure that users can have 
a greater confidences in financial reports. A strong audit profession helps maintain and 
promote confidence and integrity in Australia’s capital markets.63 
 
The inspections carried out by ASIC primarily cover those RCAs who audit public 
interest entities which includes public companies (and incorporates listed companies) 
under the Corporations Act.64 ASIC has legislative access to all files and its inspectors 
investigate judgments, decisions and opinions that form a part of or lead to the audit 
opinion.  Section 13 of the ASIC Act provides ASIC with general powers of 
investigation which allows it to undertake investigations of RCAs who conduct audits 
pursuant to the Corporations Act.65 ASIC can also seek from RCAs any ‘information 
or books’ that relate to ASIC’s functions and powers with respect to the Corporations 
                                                 
62 See the CADB website for announcements of cases and various sanctions: Companies Auditors 
Disciplinary Board, Australian Government CADB Decisions, < 
http://www.cadb.gov.au/decisions/cadb-decisions/>.  
63 See the ASIC website on Audit inspection and surveillance programs, (11 July 2016),  
http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-reporting-and-audit/auditors/audit-inspection-and-
surveillance-programs/. 
64 Australian Securities and Investment Commission, Audit inspection program report for 2012-13, Rep 
397, 27 June 2014, para 1 
65 ASIC Act s 13(a). 
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Act.66 ASIC conducts regular inspections of a selection of RCAs. Its report for the 18 
months ending 31 December 2013 reveals that it inspected all Big 4 firms,67 four mid-
tier firms and nine smaller firms.68   
 
There may be a legislative intent under s 13 of the ASIC Act for ASIC to have 
investigative powers for audits conducted by RCAs beyond the Corporations Act.  
Section 13(1)(b)(i) of the ASIC Act deals with laws of Australian jurisdictions which 
concern the management or affairs of a ‘body corporate.’ The s 9 definitions of the 
Corporations Act leads to this being a ‘registrable Australian body.’ This includes 
many entities which are required to have an audit under non-Corporations Act 
legislation (e.g. local governments). Given that RCAs also carry out non-Corporations 
Act audits, then one of the effects of s 13(1)(b)(i) may be to provide ASIC with the 
power to deal with all audit activities of RCAs, not only those relating to Corporations 
Act audits. The investigation of a non-Corporations Act audits by ASIC though may 
also implicate non RCA’s. Section 19 of the Corporations Act provides ASIC with 
powers to examine any person when carrying out an investigation.  
 
Professional accounting bodies’ quality reviews 
Professional accounting bodies monitor their members in public practice through a 
quality review process. These reviews are carried out under the auspices of each 
professional accounting body’s policies and have no legislative support.  Every member 
in public practice is subject to a regular review of their whole practice, at least every 
five years. While each of the professional accounting bodies have their own objectives 
for quality reviews the general theme is that they are designed to maintain high 
standards, protect the reputation and brand of their members, and be in the public 
interest.69 
 
                                                 
66 ASIC Act s 30A(2).  This also includes the ACNC Act and overseas audit requirements. The term used 
is ‘Australian auditor’ and the ASIC Act s 5 implies that this relates to RCAs. 
67 The Big 4 is a common term to collectively describe the four large accounting firms. These firms are 
Deloitte Australia, Ernst & Young, KPMG and Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC). 
68 Australian Securities and Investment Commission, n 63, para 162. While ASIC selects firms the 
underlying principle is that it is the RCAs, be they natural persons, audit firms or audit companies, which 
are subject to the inspection. 
69 For example, see The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, ‘Quality Review: past, present 
and future Getting the balance right’, (August 2010), 7. 
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A quality review will frequently include a review of audit activities where a member 
acts as an auditor. From an audit perspective, it is fair to say that the dominant 
professional accounting body is CA ANZ. Its quality review program separates 
members who undertake audits into two main groups. One group contains those who 
conduct audits requiring an RCA and these members are subject to a quality review 
every three years. Other members who conduct audits are reviewed every five years.   
 
For those members of the first group who are also subject to ASIC inspections, their 
quality review tries to avoid duplicating the work done by ASIC. As a result, those 
reviews often rely on online quantitative surveys to firms’ audit staff at all levels. Data 
gathered are reported back to firms to aid them in improving their systems and dealing 
with the areas of concern identified. For RCAs not inspected by ASIC and the other 
group members, they are subject to a visit by a quality reviewer. The reviewer uses 
information acquired through a questionnaire and the on-site examination to assess 
compliance with relevant pronouncements. 
 
Quality reviewers though are faced with an impediment regarding access to client files 
when undertaking a review.  An auditor must maintain confidentiality70 of client 
engagement documentation71 and audit files can only be disclosed to other parties when 
there is a legal obligation to do so or client consent has been given.72 Hence, when a 
review of a member’s audit files is carried out, consent needs to be obtained from the 
audit client so that the reviewer can access the files. It follows that if no such consent 
is received then no review of that audit file can be carried out. When accessing client 
files the reviewer is seeking evidence that the member is, inter-alia, complying with 
relevant auditing standards. The reviewer does not investigate any judgments, decisions 
or opinions that form a part of or lead to the audit opinion. If a professional accounting 
body’s quality review detects activities by a member that contravene policies or 
standards (e.g. if a member performs an audit which does not fully comply with the 
auditing standards) then that member can be referred to a disciplinary process where 
                                                 
70 Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board, Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, 
APES110, 2013, para 140. 
71 Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board, Quality Control for Firms, APES320, 2009 
paras 2(b) and 96. 
72 Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board, n 70, para 97. 
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sanctioning powers range from reprimand to expulsion from membership. This process 
also includes any RCAs who are members of the professional accounting bodies.73 
 
A comparison of the oversight roles 
The specific oversight functions of ASIC and the professional accounting bodies are 
presented in Tables 1 and 2 below.  
                                                 
73 The Annual Statement by an Auditor for ASIC re-registration as an RCA requires the RCA to advise 
if they have ceased membership of a professional accounting body or been subject to any disciplinary or 
similar procedures from a professional accounting body. 
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Table 1. ASIC Oversight Roles 
Auditor type Corporations Act audits Non-Corporations Act audits 
RCA Yes Unknown74 
Member of professional 
accounting body who 
undertakes audit, other than 
RCAs 
Not applicable No 
 
Table 2. Professional Accounting Bodies Oversight Roles 
Auditor type Corporations Act audits Non-Corporations Act audits 
RCA Yes Yes 
Member of professional 
accounting body who 
undertakes audit, other than 
RCAs 
Not applicable Yes 
 
The co-regulatory environment for the oversight of RCAs by ASIC and the professional 
accounting bodies appears to consist of two different oversight regimes that lack a 
dedicated, coordinated and cohesive strategy. This approach raises questions about 
auditor oversight and by association, compliance with the Francis framework. A more 
detailed critique of the co-regulatory environment is undertaken in the next section of 
this paper and several inconsistencies are identified. 
 
V. INCONSISTENCIES OF THE CO-REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
A closer examination of the co-regulatory environment for the oversight of RCAs 
reveals that this environment could be inconsistent in several areas including: (1) the 
selection bias of the ASIC inspection program; (2) accessing client engagement 
documentation; (3) interaction between professional accounting bodies and ASIC; (4) 
legal enforceability of non-Corporations Act audits; (5) differences in ASIC inspections 
vs. quality reviews; and (6) auditor option choice and stakeholder protection. 
 
Selection bias of the ASIC inspection programs 
The selection bias of RCA inspections by ASIC can lead to negligent RCA’s going 
undetected. There can be inconsistent treatment of RCAs based on whether they are 
selected for an ASIC inspection. The ASIC inspection program uses a risk-based (non-
random) sampling approach in selecting RCAs for inspection.75 The ASIC report for 
the 18 months ending the 31st December 2013 indicated that it inspected 17 firms which 
                                                 
74 Refer to discussion above re ASIC’s potential powers under the ASIC Act section s13(1)(b)(i). 
75 ASIC, n 63, para 12.  The term RCA is used to describe a registered company auditors regardless of 
whether they be a natural person, an audit firm or an audit company. 
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undertook audits requiring RCAs. However, there are many other firms and RCAs not 
selected for inspection by ASIC.76 The regular monitoring of these non-inspected RCAs 
is left to the mandatory annual statement (effectively self-reporting) which the RCAs 
provide to ASIC.77 Moreover, those RCA’s that are not selected for inspection by ASIC 
are subject to the quality review processes of the professional accounting bodies. If the 
annual statement does not provide any triggers for ASIC to investigate an RCA, then it 
remains for the professional accounting bodies’ quality review process to provide the 
regulatory function. Consequently, those RCAs who are selected for an ASIC 
inspection receive a different level of scrutiny than those who are not. This selection 
bias results in inconsistent treatment of RCA’s. 
 
Accessing client engagement documentation 
Access to client engagement documentation differs between ASIC inspections and 
professional accounting body quality reviews. Lack of access to client files can hide 
evidence that might reveal auditor negligence which by implication, means that RCAs 
are treated unequally. Under ASIC inspections, the inspectors have unrestricted access 
to any or all client engagement documentation and RCAs must accede to ASIC’s 
request. They can therefore discover audit non-compliance which can lead to statutory 
based disciplinary actions and sanctions being imposed against RCAs. This is not 
necessarily the case for those RCAs that are only captured by the quality review 
processes of the professional accounting bodies.  
 
Access to clients’ engagement documentation by a quality reviewer must be negotiated 
with the RCA and the client’s authorisation received. Such access relies on RCA 
cooperation and client consent. Hence, a quality reviewer may not be in a position to 
discover audit non-compliance. This different level of access to client engagement 
documentation creates unequal treatments. Hypothetically, a situation could arise 
where one RCA undertakes the audit of a company and another RCA undertakes the 
audit of, say, a local government and they both fail to conduct the audit properly. It may 
be that the RCA who conducted the audit of the company might suffer sanctions 
                                                 
76 In 2013/14 there were 4,792 RCAs in Australia.  Above n 63.  As reported only 17 firms were inspected 
and the number of RCAs captured therein is not known. However, it is reasonable to assume that the vast 
majority of RCAs were not inspected. 




pursuant to the ASIC Act and the Corporations Act. However, the RCA who audited a 
non-company might escape sanctions because the professional accounting body quality 
reviewers failed to discover negligence through an inability to access client engagement 
documentation. 
 
Interaction between ASIC and professional accounting bodies 
ASIC may not become aware of negligent conduct of an RCA even though it has been 
detected by professional accounting bodies. In 2010, the ICAA (now CA ANZ) 
published a report on the quality review process entitled: “past present and future.”78 
This specific document outlines that the interaction of the ICAA and ASIC is limited 
to a consideration of the timing and findings of each other’s oversight processes.79 
There is no indication in this report or in ASIC’s audit inspection reports or the ICAA’s 
annual quality review reports that RCA breaches discovered in the quality reviews are 
disclosed to ASIC. Negligent conduct which is detected by an ASIC inspection of an 
RCA may result in disciplinary action. However, since ASIC does not inspect all RCAs 
and the professional accounting bodies do not appear to report audit breaches to ASIC, 
then it could occur that negligent activities of an RCA in an audit (even of a 
Corporations Act audit), could result in no ASIC action being taken, despite being 
detected by the professional accounting bodies in their quality review. Thus, the lack 
of disclosure required of professional accounting bodies to ASIC could lead to 
inconsistent treatments of separate RCAs for what might be the same negligent conduct. 
 
Non-Corporations Act audits and legislative enforceability 
The extent of enforceability of powers of ASIC under s 13 of the ASIC Act with respect 
to non-Corporations Act audits by RCAs is unclear. If ASIC uses s 13 to investigate an 
RCA for an audit conducted under non-Corporations Act legislation, then it must ensure 
that it has legal capacity to do so and that it does not impinge on the laws of other 
jurisdictions. This question of enforceability has not been tested in the Courts. For 
instance, if ASIC wanted to undertake such an investigation of an RCA who was a 
partner in a Big 4 firm and who might face the prospect of losing registration, it is 
                                                 
78 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, n 68. 
79 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, n 68, 11. 
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difficult to imagine that the firm would not challenge the ability of ASIC to act in such 
a way. The outcome of that action is uncertain. 
 
If ASIC does not have the powers to investigate RCAs for audits conducted under non-
Corporations Act legislation under s 13 or if such powers are unenforceable, then all 
RCAs are not treated consistently by ASIC. In either case, it could be that audits carried 
out by RCAs outside of the Corporations Act are not subject to ASIC disciplinary 
action. The effect is that little may be done from a legislative enforcement perspective 
if an RCA conducts a non-Corporations Act audit improperly. This will be compounded 
if that RCA only carries out non-Corporations Act audits.  Hypothetically, a situation 
could arise where one RCA undertakes the audit of a company and another RCA 
undertakes the audit of a non-corporate entity (e.g. a local government), and they both 
fail to conduct the audit properly for the same reason. It might be that the RCA who 
conducted the audit of the company could suffer sanctions pursuant to the ASIC Act and 
the Corporations Act. Yet, the RCA who audited a non-company might escape 
sanctions due to the inability of ASIC to investigate, notwithstanding the fact that ASIC 
is the regulator of RCAs. Finally, the statutory regulation of RCA’s may be restricted 
to the Corporations Act audits, whereas RCAs conduct audits under many other 
auspices which might escape such regulation. 
 
Difference in ASIC inspections vs. quality reviews 
There are differences in the oversight practices employed by ASIC and the professional 
accounting bodies with respect to RCAs. ASIC investigates the judgments, decisions 
and opinions that form a part of or lead to the audit opinion of RCAs, while the 
professional accounting bodies quality reviewers do not. Quality reviewers take a 
compliance approach when reviewing members audit activities and do not necessarily 
consider other aspects of the audits. The difference between the two oversight functions 
leads to some RCAs having a level of investigation which is more probing than other 
RCAs. The inability of the professional accounting body reviewers to consider the 
judgments, decisions and opinions of an audit is a serious limitation of scope in the 
review. For instance, questions regarding the sufficiency and effectiveness of audit 
evidence gathered are not considered by the reviewer, but these are important issues in 
an ASIC inspection in determining the quality of the audit and the appropriateness of 
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the subsequent RCA audit opinion. This represents yet another example of inconsistent 
treatment of RCAs. 
 
Auditor choice and stakeholder protection 
Some legislation offers the option between an RCA and a member of a professional 
accounting body to be the auditor. This option suggests that these are equal designations 
and it would be reasonable to expect that the level of protection for stakeholders is the 
same regardless of which auditor designation is selected, which is not the case. The 
audit expertise of RCAs is verified through a demonstration to the effect that they 
possess appropriate levels of competency and integrity to obtain registration.80 
However, there is no such process for a member of a professional accounting body who 
is not an RCA and who undertakes an audit. In addition, where legislation permits a 
member of one of the professional accounting bodies to be the auditor it would be 
reasonable to expect that the level of protection for stakeholders is the same regardless 
of which member is selected. However, this expectation is simply not met. Chartered 
accountants are mandatorily required to undertake audit studies as a part of their entry 
qualifications and also their post graduate studies. Members of CPA Australia are 
required only to undertake one auditing course to obtain CPA status and IPA members 
do not have to do any courses in audit. For instance, a member of IPA who just received 
their membership and who may have never been involved in audit (either in their studies 
or workplace) are equally permitted to undertake an audit regardless of whether they 
have obtained relevant knowledge and experience.81 
 
In summary, this section of the paper has identified several inconsistencies with the co-
regulatory environment for RCA oversight in Australia. The Francis framework for 
high audit quality requires effective regulatory monitoring and oversight. It therefore 
can be concluded that the oversight of RCAs in Australia is some distance away from 
Francis’s requirements. 
 
                                                 
80 Corporations Act s 1280 and 1280A. 
81 It is acknowledged that the ethical requirements of professional accounting bodies require members to 
undertake work exercising ‘professional competence and due care’ (i.e. do not undertake work for which 
you do not have expertise). Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board, Code of Ethics for 




VI. POTENTIAL OPTIONS TO ADDRESS THE CONCERNS  
There are several options to develop an RCA oversight strategy to resolve the 
aforementioned concerns raised, which would provide an environment that would be 
closer to the framework recommended by Francis. The following section of this paper 
offers two propositions based around the present oversight processes. The first 
proposition utilises the current roles of ASIC and the professional accounting bodies, 
but recommends a change to the ambit of the RCA designation.  The second proposition 
recommends a change to the regulatory environment to cover all RCAs. 
 
Maintain the current Co-Regulatory environment 
Given that ASIC basically inspects those RCAs that affect the capital markets then one 
potential approach would be to limit the RCA designation to those entities. Hence, this 
proposition restricts the requirement for the RCA designation in the Corporations Act 
to public companies only. Therefore, any entity not being a public company (including 
other companies) will be able to use professional accounting body members as their 
auditor. Of course, it will not stop RCAs being used for audits other than public 
companies. An additional restriction is that an RCA must audit public companies82 
annually to maintain registration. This will ensure that once RCAs have registration 
that they do not move-out of the inspection program of ASIC as many have done under 
the current system. 
 
Activation of this proposition would require amendment to the Corporations Act.  This 
would reduce that number of RCAs in Australia and the flow-on effects would need to 
be carefully considered. For instance, non-Corporations Act legalisation that prescribes 
only an RCA would be well advised to amend that need. The reason being is that if 
numbers are reduced due to the recommended changes, there may not be enough RCAs 
to meet demand. Clearly, this would require the co-operation of other jurisdictions. 
 
A further streamlining could also occur where the professional accounting bodies 
accept ASIC’s inspection of RCAs and forgo their quality reviews. This would also 
extend to those RCAs who carry out audits of non-public companies. These particular 
                                                 
82 While the plural of companies is used here there is no consideration of the number of public companies 
which need to be audited by an RCA. 
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RCAs would be undertaking audits of public companies and the assumption is that the 
ASIC inspection would be sufficient. Resourcing such an approach may not be overly 
different to that which presently occurs. The ASIC inspection program may already 
cover the vast majority of these RCAs and an extension to all may not be burdensome 
to it. The professional accounting bodies’ quality review programs would cover the 
remainder, as they already do. 
 
Under this proposition, the inconsistencies of the present co-regulatory approach 
discussed in this paper would essentially be overcome. The selection bias vanishes as 
the entire population of RCAs would be inspected by ASIC. Accessing client 
engagement documentation of RCAs by professional accounting bodies would not arise 
because all RCAs would be inspected by the regulator who has the legislative authority. 
There are no issues with the lack of interaction between ASIC and professional 
accounting bodies or differences between the ASIC inspections and quality reviews as 
their oversight regimes are separated and not reliant on each other. Given that all RCAs 
are involved in Corporations Act audits, ASIC would be able to monitor their audit 
processes and address any concerns through legislative enforceability. Auditor choice 
where there is a presently an option for an RCA and someone else would be resolved if 
Australian jurisdictions were prepared to accept that the RCA designation be for public 
companies only and remove their title from applicable legislation. Certainly, this would 
not stop RCAs undertaking audits of non-public company entities, but it would resolve 
the issue of auditor choice in legislation where there are different levels of auditor 
expertise available. 
 
A potential gap which emerges from this proposition is that there would be auditors of 
some Corporations Act entities (e.g. large proprietary limited companies) who would 
not come under the auspices of ASIC. However, these audits would still be captured by 
the professional accounting bodies quality review programs, as they presently are. This 
might be challenging for ASIC though as whilst they would still be the regulator of all 
companies, they would not have a mandate over all the auditors of all companies. Yet, 
the difference here is that there would be no apparent legislative sanction for auditors 
of non-public companies who are negligent, but it appears that this sanctioning is 
questionable at present anyway. It could, however, be argued that whilst they presently 
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have legislative coverage, they are not properly fulfilling that role at least with respect 
to their auditor oversight. 
   
Change the regulatory environment 
The second proposition is more far-reaching than the first, but is somewhat simpler in 
nature. It proposes that ASIC extend its inspection program to cover all RCAs 
regardless of the type of audits conducted by them.  Specifically, the Corporations Act 
and non-Corporations Act legislation audits. Therefore, professional accounting bodies 
would not undertake their quality reviews of any RCAs with respect to audit. Whilst 
this would clearly provide ASIC with resourcing and operational concerns compared to 
what it presently does, there would also be a level of realignment of resources due to a 
reduction in the extent of reviews undertaken by the professional accounting bodies. 
Any operational concerns are probably overstated in any event because the professional 
accounting bodies already have an organisational structure in place that deals with this. 
The key advantage of this proposition is that all RCAs would be subject to the 
legislative regulator and not just those from ‘the big end of town’ as is presently the 
case. In addition, the concerns about s 13 of the ASIC Act raised in this paper would 
need to be addressed, so that it is clear that ASIC has the powers to deal with audits 
conducted by RCAs in non-Corporations Act entities. 
 
Many of the inconsistencies of the present co-regulatory approach detailed in this paper 
would essentially be overcome by this proposition. The selection bias would vanish 
since the entire population of RCAs would be inspected. Accessing client engagement 
documentation of RCAs by professional accounting bodies would not arise because all 
RCAs would be inspected by the regulator who has the legislative authority. There 
would also be no issues with the lack of interaction between ASIC and professional 
accounting bodies or differences between the ASIC inspections and quality reviews as 
all RCAs would be inspected by ASIC. Legislative enforceability issues of non-
Corporations Act audits would be addressed as identified above. However, the issue of 
auditor choice where there is presently an option for an RCA and someone else would 
need to be addressed. This would require cooperation of Australian jurisdictions to 




In summary, the advantage of these two propositions is that they utilise the existing 
oversight programs of ASIC and the professional accounting bodies. The changes in 
the propositions essentially deal with the extent of those regimes. A common thread 
between these propositions is that they both provide ASIC with greater legislative reach 
across all RCAs regardless of how they are defined. It is difficult to accept that ASIC 
has coverage of the behaviours of all RCAs, but chooses to deal with them in an 
inconsistent way. Finally, it is appreciated that ASIC applies a risk-based approach to 
its inspection program, but in terms of the Francis framework it can be concluded that 
this inconsistent treatment does not bode well for the production of high quality audits. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Francis framework for high audit quality requires an effective regulatory 
environment. The aim is to motivate auditor behaviour to produce high quality audits 
and punish those who do not. Such a regulatory environment needs to contain a 
regulator that is properly empowered and provide a clear path for effective sanctioning. 
This paper has argued that the co-regulatory environment for auditor oversight in 
Australia is inconsistent, that ASIC’s powers are unclear in certain scenarios and that 
delinquent auditors may not be subject to effective legislative sanctioning. It establishes 
that there are substantive questions in terms of whether the co-regulatory environment 
in Australia for auditor oversight meets the Francis framework.  
 
The co-regulatory environment in Australia appears to be some distance away from one 
which treats all RCAs equally and with the same level of consistent scrutiny. While 
those RCAs who audit the ‘big end of town’ appear to have considerable oversight from 
ASIC, there are many others where the level of scrutiny has been left to the professional 
accounting bodies in a non-legislative setting. The overall implications of the 
inconsistencies are that there are RCAs who may be negligent (either intentionally or 
unintentionally) but have little possibility of being detected or if detected may not be 
subject to legislative sanctioning. 
 
This paper outlines two different propositions which address the concerns raised and fit 
into the Francis framework. However, these propositions do provide some challenges 
to the current auditor monitoring and oversight provisions in Australia.  One proposition 
is to limit the requirements of the Corporations Act to restrict an RCA to be the auditor 
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of public companies only. The second proposition is to have ASIC extend its inspection 
program to cover all RCAs. It could be argued that this second proposition is only 
seeking what ASIC should already be doing. 
 
ASIC’s objective of its audit inspection program is to facilitate the production of high 
quality audits. This is intended to provide greater confidence for financial report users.  
Given that presently many RCAs are not inspected by ASIC one might wonder to what 
extent this objective is actually being achieved in practice. In any event, it is easy to 
imagine that there are many financial report users who feel that an audit oversight 
program should extend to all RCAs. If there is to be an oversight function then it should 
be one that is applied universally, comprehensively and consistently, and results from 
a strategic outlook. Employing a framework like the one envisaged by Francis seems 
to be a good place to start. 
 
 
